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Goldilocks and the Three Electricity Prices: 
Are Irish Prices “Just Right”? 
 
1. Introduction 
In the story of Goldilocks and the Three Bears, Goldilocks tries three bowls of 
porridge – one is too cold, another is too hot and one is just right. This paper looks at 
electricity prices in Ireland and Great Britain and questions whether they are too high, 
too low or “just right”. 
This paper uses data on the electricity prices from three related but separate 
jurisdictions (the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain) to examine 
the efficiency of their electricity markets in terms of the prices charged to consumers. 
It uses a model of the electricity market to derive the short run and long run marginal 
cost of electricity in the different markets. Using this as a benchmark, it considers the 
actual wholesale and retail prices in the separate markets. This analysis throws light 
on the extent to which liberalisation has delivered an efficient electricity market.   
The electricity markets on the island of Ireland and in Great Britain are affected by 
the legacy effects of different histories of investment in electricity generation, as well 
as differences in the nature of their labour markets, which affect operating costs. 
Since the end of 2007 Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland1 have shared a 
wholesale electricity market, here referred to as the All Island Market (AIM).2 The 
two regulators on the island (the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation, 
NIAUR, and the Commission for Energy regulation, CER) cooperate to regulate the 
wholesale market; retail markets are, however, regulated separately. Additionally, 
Northern Ireland is subject to the same taxes as Great Britain. Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland also share similar (and interrelated) schemes to encourage renewable 
electricity generation: the Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) and the Norther 
Ireland ROCs respectively. In the Republic of Ireland support for renewables is 
provided by a different mechanism – a feed in tariff (REFIT). Great Britain and 
                                                 
1 While the official name of the country is Ireland, for clarity of exposition we here refer to Ireland the 
country as the Republic of Ireland. 
2 It is also commonly referred to as the Single Electricity Market (SEM). 
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Northern Ireland, while both regions of the United Kingdom, have separate 
regulators: the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) and the Northern 
Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation, respectively. 
Even before the current crisis, the Irish economy was under serious pressure due to its 
high cost basis. With the dramatic downturn over the 2008-10 period, this serious 
failing has been painfully highlighted (Bergin et al., 2009). As a result, all aspects of 
the cost base facing businesses in Ireland are under scrutiny, including energy prices. 
While it is acknowledged that there is little that Ireland can do about the price of 
imported oil and gas, there is widespread questioning as to whether the price of 
electricity facing consumers, both business and residential, is too high. A range of 
different bodies have looked at Irish energy prices in a comparative context. In 
particular much attention has focussed on Irish electricity prices and how and why 
they differ from those in Great Britain and other relevant economies3.  
Great Britain also faces an uncertain future with respect to electricity prices. Most 
existing nuclear plants are due to close by the end of the decade and much coal-fired 
capacity will also have to close in 2016 as a result of the EU Large Combustion Plant 
Directive. It is not clear how this obsolete plant portfolio will be replaced and there 
are concerns that the prospective returns from investment under the current market 
rules may not result in adequate investment (Helm, 2009). Giulietti et al. (2010) show 
that the move to a bilateral contracts market in GB, combined with other changes in 
market structure, saw a squeezing of wholesale margins, with profitability being 
enhanced at the retail end. The problems facing the British electricity market need to 
be taken into account in any comparison of current prices in the Irish and British 
electricity markets. 
Using a model of the electricity market, we consider whether prices for electricity 
consumers in Ireland represent the outcome of an efficient and competitive market or 
whether there are avoidable costs, keeping prices unnecessarily high, which should be 
reduced by government policy action. Applying a similar model we evaluate whether 
prices in Great Britain are sustainable in the long term. While there is a danger that 
problems in the Irish electricity market or in the British market could result in prices 
                                                 
3 For example, the National Competitiveness Council, 2009. 
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being too high, damaging the competitiveness of the business sector, it is also possible 
that prices could be too low. This could be the case if the markets do not provide an 
adequate return on capital to new investors – if the price falls below the long run 
marginal cost.4  
In Section 2, we look at the behaviour of electricity prices in Ireland relative to those 
in Great Britain over the last 30 years. In Section 3 we briefly describe our model of 
the electricity markets in Ireland and Great Britain, which takes account of input costs 
and the generation technologies in the two markets. In Section 4 we apply this model 
to data for Ireland and Great Britain for 2008 to determine what would be the short-
run and the long-run marginal wholesale cost of electricity generation in the two 
markets under conditions of perfect competition. We then compare these results with 
the observed wholesale and retail price of electricity in the two markets and consider 
some of the reasons for the difference in costs between the two markets – labour costs 
and government policy. In Section 5 we discuss the implications of these results for 
electricity prices in the future. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. History 
Over the last 30 years electricity prices have generally been higher in the Republic of 
Ireland than in Great Britain. The gap was particularly big in the 1980s. This reflected 
the need to fund major investment in the main coal-fuelled generating station: 
Moneypoint. However, by the end of the 1990s that station had largely been paid for 
and investment in Ireland was at a low level. Over that period prices were generally 
based on the average cost of electricity generation, significantly below long run 
marginal cost by the end of the 1990s. Until the late 1990s the state-owned utility, the 
Electricity Supply Board (ESB), had total responsibility for the sector in Ireland. Over 
the period 1980-2000, when investment was undertaken this resulted in high prices 
and when there was a lull in investment the assets were “sweated” seeing prices fall 
below long run marginal cost. This approach to pricing was common in regulated 
utilities (Helm 2004). However, it is a suboptimal approach from a wider economic 
                                                 
4 Prices could also be “too low” because of environmental policy failure resulting in excessive 
consumption of energy with damaging consequences for the environment.  
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efficiency point of view, sending the wrong signals to the market and possibly leading 
to inefficient investment choices elsewhere in the economy.  
By contrast, in Great Britain following on privatisation of the industry and the break-
up of the monopoly Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) in the early 1990s, 
there was substantial excess capacity. The transmission and distribution infrastructure 
was already fully developed and the growth in the UK economy in the subsequent 
period did not result in a major increase in demand. The advent of new more efficient 
technology using natural gas (combined with low gas prices) saw a “dash for gas” in 
the 1990s, which further increased capacity. When this resulted in a major drop in 
utilisation of existing coal-fired plant, which was already fully depreciated, this spare 
capacity was moth-balled rather than decommissioned. There has consequently been 
no need for major new investment in generating capacity over the past decade. 
However, as outlined above, the prospects for the coming decade are rather different. 
The result of this excess capacity has been that, over time, electricity prices in the 
British market did not reflect the long run marginal cost of producing electricity. 
Given costs sunk in excess generating capacity, generators competed for market on 
the basis of short run marginal costs. As discussed later, this appears to have pushed 
the price below long run marginal cost.5 
This approach to pricing saw a certain “cyclicality” in the movement of Irish prices 
relative to those in Great Britain (GB from now on). Figures 1 and 2 show a 
comparison of the electricity prices (excluding both excise tax and VAT) faced by 
industry and households in Ireland and GB in nominal Euro. These data are taken 
from the IEA publication Energy Prices and Taxes.6 Figures 1 and 2 show that in the 
1980s the price of electricity in Ireland was much higher than in GB for the reasons 
set out above. However, from 1990 to the early years of the current decade there was 
little investment in the Irish system and prices tended to reflect average cost rather 
than long-run marginal cost, as was the case in GB. The excess capacity built in the 
                                                 
5 Because of the nature of the GB market with integrated utilities and bilateral contracts, the wholesale 
price is not revealed. We use a model of the GB market to estimate this wholesale price. 
6 To convert the UK prices to euro we use the average yearly exchange rate published by Eurostat post 
1999. Pre 1999 IEA uses the irrevocable 1999 exchange rate between the Irish Punt and the euro for the 
Irish series. We take the£/Punt rate pre 1999 and express it in euro at the irrevocable Irish Punt/euro 
rate to provide a comparable UK price series in euro. 
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1980s was eroded by increased demand so that the repayments on past investment 
were spread over an ever increasing volume of sales.  
Figure 1. Industry electricity prices, ex-tax, €/kWh 
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Figure 2. Household electricity prices, ex-tax, €/kWh 
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The comparison between the prices in Ireland and GB was also affected by the 
movement in energy prices. The fall in oil prices and the low gas price in Ireland in 
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the 1990s also meant that, in spite of differences in generating technology, the cost of 
the energy needed to generate electricity in Ireland also fell in real terms. 
The result of the fall in average capital costs and the change in relative prices of fuels 
meant that in the late 1990s, for a short period, prices in Ireland actually fell below 
those in GB. However, the rapid rise in gas prices (relative to coal) since 2000, 
combined with the necessary shift to pricing at long run marginal cost, has seen a 
substantial wedge open up between Irish and British prices for industrial users. The 
difference in prices for households has been somewhat less since the mid-1990s. We 
return to this issue later in this paper. 
3. The Model 
For this study, we used the WILMAR model for unit commitment and economic 
dispatch (Tuohy et al., 2009b and Meiborn et al., 2011), originally developed to study 
wind variability in the Nordic countries and subsequently adopted for the All Island 
Grid Study (DCENR and DETINI, 2008). WILMAR is designed to model hourly unit 
commitment and economic dispatch for power systems with significant wind 
penetration. In every hour generation has to match demand, determined by an 
exogenous demand curve that is assumed to be price-inelastic. The model initially 
assumes that there are no transmission constraints. It allocates demand across the 
range of generating stations that are available so as to minimise the overall cost of the 
system for each day. Costs include fuel costs (based on each individual plant’s 
efficiency), carbon taxes and start-up costs. The cost-minimising solution is subject to 
constraints on units determined by engineering factors, such as start-up time, 
minimum up and down times, ramping rates, and minimum and maximum generation, 
as well as interconnection constraints and losses, and penalties for not being able to 
meet load targets. The model has foresight of the outages of units, and does not 
consider reserve targets in this study.7  
The results are designed to model the AIM, which dispatches the system based on the 
least cost system operation. The AIM is a mandatory pool where all generators have 
to bid costs (including carbon). The cheapest plant will generally be dispatched first, 
                                                 
7 The model uses Mixed Integer Programming, with the state of each unit (online or offline) 
represented by decision variables. This ensures that each unit is modelled accurately. 
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subject to engineering constraints. The system will also ensure that there is a 
minimum number of conventional units online to guarantee system stability. Plants 
are added until there is sufficient generation to meet existing demand. The most 
expensive plant that is dispatched sets the shadow price for that hour. The shadow 
price is effectively the cost of generating of the most expensive plant used in each 
hour of each day. The model thus estimates the shadow price for each hour of each 
day and this price is paid to all plants that are generating in the relevant period. This is 
the short run marginal cost (SRMC) of producing electricity for the system. If the 
shadow price is not sufficient to cover all the plants’ short-run costs (due for example 
to additional costs incurred when plants are warming up) there is an additional  uplift 
payment. When the cost of capacity payments is added to each unit of electricity the 
resulting price reflects the long run marginal cost (LRMC) of production.8 
A similar model is set up for Great Britain. We model the wholesale market in Great 
Britain on the same basis as the Irish market, i.e. as a mandatory wholesale market 
where generators bid their short run marginal cost of production. Great Britain faces 
its own (separate) demand curve, which is also assumed to be inelastic to price 
changes. Whereas each plant on the Irish system is modelled separately, for the 
British system plants of the same type and similar efficiency are aggregated. Both the 
Irish and British systems are jointly optimised, to produce the optimal dispatch of the 
interconnection between the two islands, resulting in the lowest cost for the two 
systems taken together. 
Interconnection is modelled as a limit in transmission between the two regions, with 
an efficiency loss of 3% to ensure that one region has to be significantly cheaper than 
the other for import or export to occur. We abstract from the actual arrangements on 
the British market, which is governed by BETTA (British Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Arrangements) and is based on voluntary bilateral arrangements 
between generators, suppliers, traders and customers.9 If the British market is 
efficient, the wholesale price of electricity on the GB market should reflect the long-
run marginal cost of production, which is estimated independently by the model. 
                                                 
8 The long run marginal cost is the cost of remunerating the system including the cost of energy used in 
generation, operating cost and the remuneration of the capital employed in the system. 
9 For more on BETTA and its performance, see Newbery (2006). 
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4. Comparing Prices 
There are a range of possible reasons why electricity prices might be different in the 
All-Island Market (AIM) from those in the British market and we use the WILMAR 
model of the electricity generating systems in both markets as a means of identifying 
the SRMC and the LRMC in the two jurisdictions. WILMAR models both markets as 
mandatory pools with capacity payments. Thus, to the extent that there is a difference 
in the wholesale price estimated by the model for the two markets, this is due to either 
differences in energy input prices or differences in the generation technologies used 
on the two islands. 
The AIM market was designed to minimise the opportunity for any individual firm to 
use market power to leverage higher wholesale prices. The transparency of the market 
design facilitates the regulators’ monitoring ability. The actual operation of the market 
since its inception in November 2007 indicates that, as expected, firms have priced at 
short-run marginal cost and that the wholesale price that has resulted reflects the 
underlying perfectly competitive market price. A previous study (Lyons et al., 2007) 
showed that the AIM incentivises investment in new generation without rewarding 
new generators excessively.  
We then use the capacity payments methodology applied in the AIM to measure 
comparable capital costs in the two markets to derive the long run marginal cost of the 
two electricity systems, conditional on the short run marginal cost estimated by the 
electricity model. Different approaches to remunerating capital could see departures 
from the optimal approach of pricing at long run marginal cost. This is no longer the 
case in Ireland as the market design ensures that consumers of electricity are faced 
with the long run marginal cost of the electricity that they consume. In the case of the 
British market, as discussed later, there are doubts as to whether the current price 
actually covers the long run marginal cost for that system so that prices may have to 
rise over the coming decade (Helm, 2009). 
Later in this Section we also consider the factors determining the distribution margin 
– the difference between the wholesale price and the retail price of electricity. This 
margin, covering the costs of transmission, distribution and supply, is derived as the 
difference between long run marginal cost and the actual price faced by consumers in 
the industrial and the household electricity markets on the two islands.  
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We use data for 2008, the first full year of operation of the AIM. As discussed above, 
there are good theoretical reasons for believing that the new AIM, by providing a 
suitably transparent market structure, results in the wholesale price of electricity 
approximating the long-run marginal cost of production – what one would expect 
from a perfectly competitive market. The evidence for the first year of operation 
suggests that the AIM has largely delivered on expectations. 
It may be difficult to make definite conclusions based on one year of data since firms 
could recover in the following year excess costs from the year before. However, the 
prices calculated by the model are on the basis of no hedging of fuel prices. 
Table 1 shows the results obtained from applying the model to the Irish and British 
electricity markets for 2008. The results derived using the model are compared with 
observed wholesale prices for the markets, shown in the last line of Table 1. 
Table 1. Estimated Wholesale Price, 2008 
  Source 
Ireland Great Britain 
(€/MWh) (€/MWh)  
SRMC Model Estimate 66.0 49.6 
Capacity Payments  Model Estimate 15.4 15.4 
LRMC Model Estimate 81.4 65.0 
LRMC incl uplift and bal. cost Derived 93.7 n.a. 
Market “wholesale” price Market outturn  103.0 68.9 
 
We have used energy input price data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
publication on the price of fuel used in electricity generation for Ireland and Great 
Britain (IEA, 2009).  For Great Britain we report the price provided for the UK as a 
whole. We assume that the price for the Republic of Ireland applies to the whole 
island. The IEA does not provide information on the price of gas used in electricity 
generation in Ireland after 2003 (for confidentiality reasons) so we have used the UK 
price since then to estimate the price in both markets (€351.1/TOE for 2008).10 We 
                                                 
10 Because of the higher transmission costs for transporting gas to Ireland the price in Ireland is slightly 
higher than in GB. This would mean that the estimated cost differential between the two markets 
should be slightly higher than estimated here. 
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use an average yearly carbon price of €22.4 per tonne of CO2.11 On this basis, using 
actual hourly demand for the year separately for each jurisdiction, we estimate that the 
average price of electricity in Ireland, weighted by the share of demand in each hour, 
should have been €66.0 per megawatt hour (MWh) – equivalent to Short Run 
Marginal Cost (SRMC).12 This price reflects the price of the energy used in 
generating the electricity and any carbon cost. For Great Britain the model estimates a 
SRMC of €49.6 per MWh. Because fuel prices were fairly similar across the two 
jurisdictions, the difference in generating technologies used in the two markets 
accounts for most of the difference in SRMC between the two markets of €16.4 a 
MWh. CER (2009) estimate that the forward spark spread for 2009/10 for the AIM 
relative to BETTA was around €10.7 a MWh higher and that this was largely 
accounted for by differences in generation technology and differences in system size. 
This estimate is consistent with our estimate for 2008. 
Capacity payments, paid to ensure security of supply, are estimated to be €15.4 MWh 
in the two markets.13 Capacity payments for the AIM and BETTA were calculated 
using the ESRI’s IDEM model (Diffney et al., 2009).14 The caclulated value for the 
AIM corresponds closely to the value reported in MMU (2009). The capacity 
payments are calculated based on the full costs of an efficient new peaking plant 
fuelled by oil distillate (SEM, 2007). The capacity “pot” is divided among the plants 
that are available. The total size of the capacity pot is calibrated so that when the 
margin between demand and available capacity is small, payments will be larger to 
encourage further investment. Payments will be inadequate to remunerate new 
investment if capacity is greater than required. 
As mentioned above, Irish plants are compensated directly for start up and no load 
costs (since this is not part of either energy costs or capacity payments) if they cause 
                                                 
11 This is the unweighted average of carbon prices for 2008, based on EU allowances with the shortest 
settlement date. 
12 Because there is a single wholesale electricity market on the island of Ireland the SRMC is identical 
for both Northern Ireland and for the Republic of Ireland. 
13  For GB we aggregate some of the plants into larger plants. Thus we somewhat overestimate the 
probability that demand will not be met by supply. This in turn feeds into the calculation of capacity 
payments which means that the capacity payments presented here are an upper bound. 
14 IDEM also provided SRMCs that were similar to the WILMAR results reported here. WILMAR was 
preferred as it incorporates more detailed engineering constraints such as ramping rates. 
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any plant to make losses during a generating period. This additional payment is 
measured by the uplift term, which MMU (2009, p.38) reports as 11 per cent of the 
SRMC (expressed as an unweighted average) or  about €8.9/MWh. In addition, if 
transmission constraints cause plants not to be dispatched when they should be 
according to the merit order, the plants are compensated for their loss. These 
balancing costs accounted for about €3/MWh in Ireland (MMU, 2009). Unfortunately 
it proved impossible to obtain an estimate of these costs for the GB market. Because 
of its larger size, with many more plants, it is likely that these costs in GB would be 
less than the cost in Ireland. 
The final row of Table 1 shows the wholesale price observed on the market. In the 
case of the Irish market it is derived from the price reported in MMU (2009). It is 
calculated as the sum of the SRMC, uplift, balancing costs and capacity payments. 
The historic wholesale price for Ireland, while of a similar magnitude, is somewhat 
higher than that estimated using WILMAR.  
The GB market operates through bilateral contracts, and is therefore much less 
transparent. The spot market price in GB represents only about one percent of the 
market, and is therefore unlikely to be representative of the wholesale price. In 2008 it 
was equal to  €87.6.15 Spot market exchanges are typically made when a company has 
to balance their position at the last moment. As such, we expect the spot market price 
to be higher than the average exchange price. Another estimate of the wholesale 
market price for GB is given by the average price from OFGEM (2009) for 18-month 
hedged prices. We calculate the weighted average for 2008, where the weights are the 
share of consumption in each quarter, to find an average price of  €68.9. The ‘true’ 
price is probably somewhere in the middle, although it is more likely to be closer to 
the latter price, for the reasons given above. We therefore adopt the price reported by 
OFGEM (2009) as the most representative price in the following analysis. It is 
striking that this price is very close to the Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) estimated 
using the model, even before adjusting for the cost of “uplift”. This suggests that the 
British wholesale market might be underpricing electricity. With substantial excess 
generating capacity over the last decade, the market has seen firms “sweating their 
                                                 
15 Data from www.elexon.com 
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assets” so that the price has fallen below LRMC. This would suggest that in the future 
the British price will have to rise relative to that of Ireland if there is to be adequate 
investment in new generation over the coming decade. Unless the wholesale price 
increases to at least LRMC in the near future, the GB market could have difficulties 
securing replacement investment for the generating capacity to be retired over the 
coming decade (Helm, 2009 and CER, 2009).  
While the wholesale price in the GB market appears to be below LRMC, because the 
industry is dominated by vertically integrated utilities, profitability may be best 
assessed across the range of activities undertaken by these firms. It seems likely that 
the integrated energy utilities, while not receiving adequate remuneration from the 
wholesale market, derive exceptional profits from their retail operations, which could 
incentivise new investment (Giulietti et al.¸2010).  
This strategy has significant attractions for integrated firms. By keeping the wholesale 
price low they discourage entry by new generators, as has happened in Ireland. It is 
much more difficult for firms to build a retail customer base than to build a generator 
and hence building a new integrated firm from scratch is exceptionally difficult, other 
than by takeover. Thus the effect of this strategy is to protect incumbents from new 
entry.  
Table 2. Retail Prices and Margins, 2008 
  Source 
Republic of 
Ireland 
Northern 
Ireland 
Great 
Britain 
(€/MWh) (€/MWh) (€/MWh) 
Market “wholesale” 
price Market outturn  103.0 95.54 68.9 
Industry Price – IEA pre-tax 127.2  97.3 
 
Implied distribution 
margin 24.2  28.4 
     
Households Price – IEA 161.0 140.4 152.1 
 
Other Costs (PSO 
and ROC/CERT) 0 6.73 9.6 
 
Implied distribution 
margin 58.0 38.2 73.6 
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 In Table 2 we compare the wholesale market prices in the two markets with the retail 
prices reported by the IEA. This price is the average price per MWh, including 
standing charges and excluding all taxes. We also include information for Northern 
Ireland.16 We define the retail margin as the difference between the retail price and 
the wholesale price. The gap between these two prices is made up of payments for 
transmission and distribution (use of the wires) as well as for supply of electricity 
(billing etc.). The margin also includes the profit of the firms operating in the sector. 
Finally, public policy also has an impact on the margin, in particular through 
implementing a range of incentive measures to encourage activities that are 
considered desirable from a public policy point of view – such as renewable 
generation 
The GB market has experienced many years of competition between what are now 
vertically integrated utilities. In addition the transmission system is owned by 
National Grid, a regulated private monopoly. This structure might be expected to have 
driven down costs in the industry in GB. However, as discussed above, the nature of 
the market could see the incumbent integrated utilities extracting excess profits, in 
part due to their ability to restrict entry.  
By contrast, in 2008 the Irish market was dominated by the state-owned Electricity 
Supply Board (ESB). The ESB is responsible for building and managing the 
transmission and distribution network and also, until recently, was effectively the sole 
supplier of electricity to the household market. In the absence of appropriate 
regulation, with a state-owned dominant player there is the danger that the cost of 
delivering electricity could be excessive, either due to very high profits or, 
alternatively, to very high labour costs, where employees capture the monopoly rent. 
The task of the regulator, the CER, is to ensure that this does not occur. If they have 
been successful then any monopoly rents captured by labour will result in lower 
                                                 
16 While Northern Ireland in 2008 was part of the AIM wholesale market, the “wholesale price” shown 
here is derived as a weighted average of the price for the years 2007/8 and 2008/9. Hence it differs 
slightly from the wholesale price for the Republic of Ireland. However, we use a consistent set of 
weights for all the other prices in Northern Ireland so that the information on retail margins is internally 
consistent. 
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profitability (and dividends) for the owner – the state, rather than higher prices. 
However, if through information asymmetry the regulator does not manage to fully 
control costs, this could result in a higher cost for consumers than would occur if the 
market were “competitive”.17 
In Table 2 we consider this implied retail margin for 2008. For industrial users in the 
Republic of Ireland, the margin is actually very similar to that in Britain. On a priori 
grounds one would expect it to be a bit higher in Ireland because of the lower density 
of the electricity network. However, as discussed earlier, some of the higher margin 
observed in the GB market may reflect the fact that the wholesale price is less than 
LRMC and integrated firms recoup some of this “loss” through higher retail margins. 
The difference in the retail margins between the different household markets is 
significantly greater than in the case of the industrial market. The margin in the 
British market is exceptionally high, even when allowance is made for government 
mandated environmental costs, which include the cost of the Renewable Obligations 
scheme and the Carbon Emissions Reducing Target.18 The margin in the Republic of 
Ireland is significantly lower than in Great Britain, with the margin in Northern 
Ireland being lower still. As in the case of the industrial market, some of this 
enhanced margin in the British market may be due to firms recouping their “losses” 
on the wholesale market. Nonetheless, the margin still looks high and it raises issues 
about the extent of competition between the integrated utilities on the British 
household market.  
This issue is examined in Giulietti et al. (2010). They find a substantial impact in the 
GB market arising from the strong retail positions of integrated firms and they cite 
evidence of large positive changes in supplier profitability over time as vertical 
integration developed.  Giulietti et al. (2005) show that the incumbent electricity 
provider has maintained significant market power in the residential sector. Wilson and 
Waddams (2010) also find that after liberalisation consumers have not minimised 
                                                 
17 The Northern Ireland market is similar to the Republic of Ireland market with a single dominant firm, 
Northern Ireland Electiricty/Viridian which is regulated by the NIAUR. 
18 The estimate of these costs presented in Table 2 is calculated from Ofgem and NIAUR (2009), page 
27.  Ofgem reports that environmental costs account for about 6 per cent of the residential electricity 
bill. 
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their electricity costs by choosing the cheapest supplier, leading to higher average 
retail margins for suppliers in Great Britain. 
There was a lower margin in Northern Ireland relative to the Republic of Ireland, even 
before adjusting for payments under the Public Service Obligation (PSO).19 To some 
extent this margin is affected by a legacy long-term contract. Nonetheless, Northern 
Ireland consumers face similar wholesale prices to consumers in the Republic of 
Ireland and as the price in both cases is controlled by the relevant regulator they are 
comparable. This lower margin would suggest that the NIAUR has been reasonably 
successful in regulating the market to ensure that costs are kept to a minimum. 
While the CER in the Republic of Ireland should only allow “reasonable” labour costs 
and profits in the charges for use of the network and for supply, it may be difficult for 
them to arrive at an estimate of what is “reasonable”. Thus, in 2008, there may have 
been some pass through of high labour costs into consumer prices, affecting the retail 
margin. In the price review being currently being undertaken by the CER they are 
seeking significant further reductions in cost. 
Figure 3: Labour costs in electricity gas and water relative to manufacturing 
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Germany
Denmark
Euro area
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Netherlands
Sweden
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1988 1996 2004
                                                 
19 Data for Northern Ireland come from NIAUR (2009) and the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility 
Regulation directly. 
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There are reasons for believing that the costs, especially labour costs, of the ESB in 
the Republic of Ireland were relatively high (Deloitte, 2007). While new entry has 
provided competition in the generation market, the ESB’s business in building and 
maintaining the transmission and distribution systems has only been subjected to 
limited competitive pressures by contracting out the provision of some of the 
necessary services. This shows up in the fact that labour costs in the electricity, gas 
and water sector in Ireland are much higher relative to manufacturing than is the case 
for other comparable EU countries.20 In 2004 labour costs in the sector in Ireland 
were more than 80 per cent higher than in manufacturing whereas in the UK they 
were only 27 per cent higher (see Figure 3). This premium for working in the utilities 
sector (largely electricity) has actually increased in Ireland since 1988 (FitzGerald and 
McCoy, 1993) and it is the highest amongst the countries shown. For countries that 
have had competitive electricity markets since at least the early 1990s (e.g. the UK, 
Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands) the premium is much smaller and, in the case 
of Britain, it has fallen over the same period. This would suggest that the employees 
in the monopoly element of the electricity sector in Ireland continued to enjoy rents 
up to at least 2004, rents which had been competed away elsewhere.  
However, when contrasted with the margin in Britain, the evidence would suggest that 
the CER has maintained significant control over the pass through of costs into the 
retail market. This means that, to the extent that labour costs are excessive in the 
sector, the result has been reduced profitability (and a reduced dividend for the owner, 
the government) rather than higher retail prices. 
5. Future Prices 
In the case of Great Britain, the wholesale price in 2008 was probably too low, being 
insufficient to remunerate the long-run marginal cost of generating electricity. This 
conclusion is similar to that of other studies (Helm, 2009 and CER, 2009). If the 
British market is to continue to enjoy a secure electricity supply over the coming 
decade very substantial new investment in generation will be required. For this to 
happen investors will have to be reassured that their investment will be adequately 
                                                 
20 Data are not available for electricity on its own. However, employment in electricity makes up the 
bulk of employment in the sector. 
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remunerated through the wholesale electricity price rising to reflect the true long run 
marginal cost of producing electricity.  
In the Irish market prices already reflect LRMC so that, ceteris paribus, there is likely 
to be some narrowing in the difference between the retail prices in the two markets 
over the coming decade. The retail margin for household consumers may be further 
squeezed by the regulator over the next few years. However, for industrial consumers 
the retail margin appears reasonably competitive relative to Britain. 
There are a number of areas where current public policy may cause higher electricity 
prices in Ireland and Great Britain in the future. In some cases these higher prices will 
come with commensurate societal benefits, for example in the form of lower 
pollution, but in other cases the societal benefits may be strictly limited.   
The EU Emissions Trading Regime (ETS) is likely to see a rising price for carbon 
within the EU. With competitive markets this price of carbon has already been 
incorporated into the price facing consumers. This provides the appropriate signal for 
consumers, encouraging a reduction in emissions at a minimum cost to society. Until 
now these permits have been largely granted at a zero cost to incumbent generators. 
This has resulted in windfall gains for companies owning electricity generation, 
strengthening the position of incumbents relative to new entrants (FitzGerald, 2004). 
However, from 2013 an increasing share of the ETS permits will be auctioned. This 
should not directly affect electricity consumers as they are already paying the full 
market price of the permits in their electricity bills. 
A second important area of public policy is the range of measures that have been 
taken to encourage renewable generation. In Great Britain the approach taken through 
the imposition of a Renewables Obligation (ROCs) is significantly more costly than it 
need be (Helm, 2010).21 The cost in 2008 of this scheme for consumers is included in 
Table 2. In addition to the current situation, where payments are made to relatively 
low cost onshore wind generators, the commitment to developing large volumes of 
offshore wind and wave power in the future is likely to prove very expensive. If this 
policy is implemented over the coming decade through the current ROCs mechanism, 
                                                 
21 McIlveen (2010) estimates that the implied carbon price under the scheme is £130 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide. 
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it will result in a major increase in the cost of electricity for customers in GB 
(McIlveen, 2010). From an environmental point of view, it will be very bad value for 
money. 
In the Irish case, because of high energy prices in 2008 and overpayment in previous 
years, the Public Service Obligation (PSO), designed to support public objectives, 
including deployment of renewables, was zero. However, for 2011 it will amount to 
around €6 per MWh. While some of this PSO goes to fund the support mechanism for 
renewables, a substantial part goes to support peat-fired generation. This fuel 
produces very large amounts of carbon dioxide per unit of electricity generated so it is 
particularly damaging from an environmental point of view. The justification for this 
expenditure is partly to support employment and partly for security of supply. 
However, it is an expensive way of meeting both these targets.22 A removal of this 
obligation would clearly be beneficial (Tuohy et al., 2009a) 
A second element of public policy in the Republic of Ireland, which could end up 
proving expensive, is part of the REFIT scheme to support renewables.23 This scheme 
provides a guaranteed price which is different for different types of renewables. In the 
case of onshore wind this arrangement may well be broadly appropriate. It serves to 
reduce uncertainty for investors which, in turn, should reduce the cost of capital 
reducing the price they need to receive to make investment economic. There are some 
concerns that support may prove overgenerous in the long term and the regime may, 
as a result, need some tweaking. Wind lowers the average shadow price when it is 
blowing (since it displaces fossil-fuel operated plants). At the same time it increases 
uplift and PSO costs.  The net effect is a priori unclear, but will tend to be more 
beneficial the higher fossil fuel prices are.  Diffney et al. (2009) conclude that the 
level and mechanisms of support appear broadly correct and likely to deliver benefits 
for consumers if energy prices are in the mid to high range as suggested by the IEA. 
This means that the extensive deployment of onshore wind (with interconnection to 
the GB market) will provide an important hedge against the risk of high energy prices. 
                                                 
22 Because of the high gas price in 2008 and the relatively low carbon price it was economic to run the 
peat stations. However, with lower gas prices peat stations will again raise electricity prices while 
continuing to add unnecessarily to Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions. 
23 This is a feed-in tariff. In 2008 because of high energy prices the cost of this scheme was very low. 
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The fact that Ireland may see a very large deployment of wind by 2020 and that this 
may reduce the cost of electricity for consumers under certain plausible scenarios is 
due to the nature of Ireland’s onshore wind resource. 
Because Ireland is likely to see all the onshore wind that the system can absorb 
without major cost to consumers there is unlikely to be any room or need for very 
high cost offshore wind. Thus the high REFIT price for offshore wind could see Irish 
electricity consumers paying a very high price by 2020, with no commensurate 
savings in greenhouse gases (because offshore wind would only replace cheap 
onshore wind). Denny (2009) has shown that tidal power, which is supported by the 
REFIT scheme, is also likely to be dominated by onshore wind because of its likely 
higher capital cost. 
Finally, in 2009 the government used a significant part of the windfall gain accruing 
to generators from the free allocation of ETS permits to subsidise electricity 
consumption for industrial users. This was not a sensible use of these windfall gains. 
It would have been wiser if they had been paid to the government (the owner of the 
ESB) as a dividend, facing industrial consumers with the true economic cost of 
electricity. 
6. Conclusions 
Electricity prices for consumers must reflect the long run marginal cost - they should 
face the true economic cost of electricity (including environmental costs). 
Underpricing is bad environmentally and economically.  
The new All Island Market in Ireland began successfully. It has ensured that the 
wholesale price is set at short run marginal cost – the minimum sustainable level. In 
addition, the capacity payments regime seems to be reasonably well calibrated so that 
the price paid to consumers reflects the true long run marginal cost of producing 
electricity in Ireland. Investors need to minimise uncertainty and regulators should be 
loath to make major changes in this regime, which could raise doubts about the 
viability of investment. This suggests that the wholesale price for electricity in Ireland 
was “just right” in 2008. 
By contrast the wholesale price of electricity in Great Britain was below the long run 
marginal cost of generating electricity. This is unsustainable in the long run. In 2008 
the wholesale price of electricity in Ireland was over €30 a MWh higher than in Great 
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Britain. Around €16 a MWh of this price difference is attributable to differences in 
generating technology. However, the bulk of the rest is due to prices being “too low” 
in the British market. 
There is evidence that the retail margin for consumers, especially households, was too 
high in both markets, resulting in prices for consumers being “too high”. This 
confirms the findings of Giulietti et al., 2010. In the case of the British market this 
was made possible by the growth of vertically integrated utilities. Some of this excess 
margin compensated these companies for the very low wholesale price. 
In the case of the Republic of Ireland, the high cost base of the ESB probably resulted 
in some increase in the retail margin above what would have arisen in a competitive 
market. However, this “excess” was limited in size and the regulator may erode this in 
coming years. However, while the consumer may be insulated from high costs, the 
result would be lower profitability and dividends in the state run utility than would 
occur under a competitive regime – a cost to society. 
Finally, public policy is adding to electricity prices in both jurisdictions. In some 
cases this increase in cost is justified by the commensurate societal benefits which 
will result from the charges. However, in the Republic of Ireland the policy of 
subsidising peat generation is unwise, as was the use of windfall profits to subsidise 
electricity prices for industrial consumers in 2009. In the case of the United Kingdom, 
the policy of supporting major investment in renewables offshore, if implemented, is 
likely to prove hugely expensive over the coming decade and there are unlikely to be 
commensurate societal gains from this policy. 
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